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Beware of Courts Bearing Gifts: Transparency
and the Court of Justice of the European Union
Marios COSTA* & Steve PEERS**
This article reconsiders the principle of transparency in the European Union (EU) legal order and
takes as its focal point the contribution of the EU Courts as regards the presumptions of non-disclosure
of EU documents. The aim is to investigate the role played by the judiciary in relation to a twofold
question: How open can the Union’s decision-making be, and is it possible for citizens to participate
in the decision-making process of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies? The article argues that
accountability deficits in the field of access to documents have been filled, to an extent, by the EU
Courts’ imposition of boundaries on the broad derogations to the right of access to documents. But
nevertheless, the article concludes that the establishment through the case law of general presumptions
against openness has fundamentally weakened the standards of accountability. Rather regrettably,
although the EU legislature set the default position to the widest access to documents, this has been
reversed to non-disclosure by the EU judiciary as regards non-legislative documents.
1 INTRODUCTION
This article examines the problematic aspects of the EU’s access to documents regime,
namely the ambiguously drafted derogations from the right of access to documents and
the development of general presumptions of non-disclosure of documents through the
case law. In particular, the article argues that the EUCourts’ imposition of boundaries on
the derogations to the access right mitigates, to an extent, the problematic aspects of the
access rules. Yet, the more recent development (by the same courts) of a set of
presumptions against openness has actually worsened the standards of accountability
by reversing the default position, specifically in relation to non-legislative documents,
from the widest possible access to non-disclosure.
To substantiate the argument described above, the article firstly examines the
legislative framework as regards the access to documents rules and outlines the
contribution of the EU Courts before the adoption of the EU’s Transparency
Regulation from the point of view of accountability. Secondly, the article assesses in
detail whether the framework incorporated by the Transparency Regulation,1 as
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applied to date, enhances openness in the decision-making process. The article
concludes that, as regards non-legislative documents, the net effect of judicial devel-
opments in the area of presumptions is to reduce the standards for public accountability
that previously applied.
2 OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
It is often alleged that the EU’s decision-making is insufficiently transparent and
that accountability deficits are even growing, something which compromises the
Union’s overall legitimacy.2 The widespread notion that the Union’s decision-
making process lacked accountability and legitimacy3 was highlighted by the
problems that arose during the process of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.4
In consequence, the EU institutions had to consider alternatives that would
rectify this public disinterest and would bring the Union closer to the citizens.
Access to documents was seen from the early days as a major part of the solution
to the Union’s legitimacy problems and has been at the core of transparency
efforts.5
The initial step, which proved to be the cornerstone of the public’s fundamental
right to information, was a Declaration on transparency attached to the Final Act of
the Maastricht Treaty. This provided that transparency enhances the democratic
2 M. Costa, The Accountability Gap in EU Law (Oxon: Routledge, 2017); S. Peers & M. Costa Accountability
for Delegated and Implementing Acts After the Treaty of Lisbon, 18 E.L.J. 427 (2012); S. Peers & M. Costa,
Judicial Review of EU Acts After the Treaty of Lisbon, 8 E.C.L. Rev. 82 (2012); S. Peers & M. Costa Reassessing
the Accountability of EU Decentralized Agencies: Mind the Independence Gap 22 E.P.L. 645 (2016); H. Cooper,
Where European Democracy Goes to Die, (Politico 2016); D. Curtin & P. Leino, In Search of Transparency for
EU Law-Making: Trilogues on the Cusp of Dawn, 54 C.M.L. Rev. 1673 (2017); D. Curtin & P. Hart, The
Real World of EU Accountability, What Deficit? (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010); Accountability and
Legitimacy in the EU (A. Arnull & D. Wincott eds, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). See also
P. Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human Rights? 58 A.L. Rev. 177 (2006).
3 S. Peers, The New Regulation on Access to Documents: A Critical Analysis, 21 Y.E.L. 385 (2002);
I. Osterdahl, Openness v. Secrecy: Public Access to Documents in Sweden and the European Union 23 E.L.
Rev. 4, 336 (1998).
4 The negative response from the Danish electorate and also the very near to the majority of the
electorate voting in the referendum in 1992 chose to reject France’s ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty. There were also challenges to ratification in the UK Parliament and the German
Constitutional Court.
5 It must be noted here that the majority of the Member States, with the notable exception of Cyprus,
have regulated the issue and introduced provisions on public access either at Constitutional or at
legislative level. Constitutional provisions exist in Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,
Belgium, and Finland. Legislative provisions regulating access to documents exist in France, Denmark,
Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Italy, Germany, the United kingdom, Luxembourg, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. A compara-
tive analysis of the Union’s public access to documents rules with public access legislation in the
Member States reveals that the issue had already been regulated at the national level years before the
EU legislation on the issue was introduced. See e.g. H. Kranenborg & W. Voermans, Access to
Information in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis of EC and Member State Legislation
(Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2005).
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credentials of the institutions and increases the public’s confidence in the
administration.6 It illustrated the political willingness for the establishment of a
‘right’ of access to information and is commonly considered as the beginning of a
more transparent era in the EU.7 In response to the Declaration and with the aim of
bringing the Union closer to the citizens, the Commission first surveyed national law
on access to documents and then released a communication on the issue.8 In the
same year the Code of Conduct9 on access to documents was adopted and shortly
afterwards implemented by the Council10 and the Commission.11
The next step towards more transparency came with the Treaty of Amsterdam
which provided that decisions need to be taken as openly and closely as possible to the
citizen (Article 1 Treaty on European Union (TEU)). More importantly, under old
Article 255 EC (added by the Treaty of Amsterdam) any EU citizen and any natural or
legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State could have access
to European Parliament (EP), Council and Commission documents. Access was to be
denied for the protection of certain public and private interests to be determined by
the Council under the then co-decision procedure. Currently, Article 15 Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (which replaced Article 255 EC)
requires all the EU organs to conduct their work openly. These Treaty amendments
show clearly the political consensus to incorporate the principle of transparency in the
EU. What is less clear, however, is the exact status of transparency in the EU legal
order due to national divergences on the issue. 12
3 THE PRE-REGULATION REGIME: THE CODE OF CONDUCT
The main principle enshrined in the Code was that of the ‘widest possible access to
documents’13 and the narrowest interpretation of the exceptions, the latter being a
corollary of the former. The Code provided for access to be denied where
6 Declaration No. 17, Treaty of the European Union, Maastricht, 7 Feb. 1992.
7 S. Peers, From Maastricht to Laeken: The Political Agenda of Openness and Transparency in the EU in
Increasing Transparency in the European Union (V. Deckmyn ed., Maastricht: EIPA 2002); A. Tomkins,
Transparency and the Emergence of a European Administrative Law, 19 Y.E.L. 220 (1999/2000); D. Curtin
& H. Meijer, The Principle of Open Government in Schengen and the European Union: Democratic
Retrogression?, 32 C.M.L. Rev. 391 (1995).
8 [1993] OJ L 156/5 and [1993] OJ L 166/4.
9 93/730/EC, Code of Conduct concerning public access to Council and Commission documents,
[2003] OJ L340/41.
10 Decision 93/731, [1993] OJ L 340/43.
11 Decision 94/90, [1994] OJ L 340/41.
12 A. Guggenbuhl, A Miracle Formula or an Old Powder in New Packaging? Transparency and Openness After
Amsterdam in Openness and Transparency in the European Union, (V. Deckmyn & I. Thomson,
Maastricht: EIPA, 1998); R. W. Davis, Public Access to Community Documents: A Fundamental Human
Right?, 3 E.I.O.P. 8 (1999).
13 Swenska Journalistforbundet v. Council (T-174/95) EU:T:1998:127 at 110; WWF v. Commission (T-105/
95) EU:T:1998:127 at 56; Interporc (I) v. Commission (T-124/96) EU:T:1998:25 at 49; Kuijer (II) v.
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disclosure could undermine the protection of certain public and private interests.
Nevertheless, the very wide non-exhaustive list of mandatory exceptions14 effec-
tively changed the balance from positive rights with negative exceptions to a text
which treated access as the exception. Even after the enactment of the Code there
was dissatisfaction with the state of openness. The Council and the Commission,
based on a system of secrecy, were reluctant to implement the Code in favour of
openness.15 This led to the consistent refusal of various documents. As a result, the
EU Courts handed down several judgments interpreting the Council’s and the
Commission’s decisions denying access under the Code.
The Court of First Instance, now the General Court, held, for instance, that
the exceptions must be justified on objective grounds and be applied strictly in a
manner that did not defeat the application of the widest possible access.16 More
importantly, the Courts ruled that abstract and general justifications could not be
accepted and that the institutions were obliged to state reasons. In doing so, the
institutions needed to carry out a concrete and individual assessment before
deciding whether or not to release the requested documents.17 The risk of the
public or private interest being undermined must be reasonably foreseeable and not
purely hypothetical.18
In this regard, the Court of First Instance ruled in Kuijer (II)19 that the Council
had wrongly applied the exception for ‘international relations’. In the Court’s
Council (T-211/00) EU:T:2002:30 at 55; B. Vesterdorf, Transparency-not Just a Vague Word,22
Fordham Int’l L. J. 902 (1999).
14 Carlsen v. Council (T-610/97) EU:T:1998:48 at 48 where the President of the Court ruled that the
mandatory exceptions regarding the protection of the public interest were not exhaustive and that an
exception relating to the stability of the Community legal order which covers also the legal advice
given by the legal service of the institutions existed.
15 A. Alemanno & O. Stefan,Openness at the Court of Justice of the European Union: Toppling a Taboo, 51 C.M.L.
Rev. 97 (2014); D. Curtin, Official Secrets and the Negotiation of International Agreements: Is the EU Executive
Unbound?, 50 C.M.L. Rev. 423 (2013); C. Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2002); See also the open letter addressed to the Secretary General of the Council by the
European Federation of Journalists dated 30 Apr. 1996 mentioning ‘grave reservations about the Council’s
interpretation and practice of the Code of Conduct concerning access to documents’.
16 WWF v. Commission (T-105/95) EU:T:1997:26 at 55. This was the first judgment on access to documents
rules concerning the Commission. It established that the internal institutional rules on access are capable of
conferring rights on citizens as well as imposing obligations upon the Commission. The General Court also
ruled on the public interest exception concerning inspections and investigations and held that the
documents relating to infringement proceedings according to Art. 226 EC Treaty, now Art. 258 TFEU,
satisfy the conditions that must be met by the Commission in order to rely on the public interest exception
pursuant to Art. 4(1) of the Code of Conduct. Netherlands v. Council (C-58/94) EU:C:2003:125;
Netherlands and Van der Wal v. Commission (C-174/98 P & 189/98 P) EU:C:2000:1 at 27 and Hautala v.
Council (C-353/99 P) EU:C:2001:661 at 25; R. W. Davis, The Court of Justice and the Right of Public Access to
Community-Held Documents, 25 E.L. Rev. 303 (2000).
17 Van der Wal v Commission (T-83/96) EU:T:1998:59 at 43; Interporc (I) v. Commission (T-124/96) EU:
T:1998:25 at 52; Svenska Journalistforbundet v. Council (T-174/95) EU:T:1998:127 at 112 and Hautala v.
Council (C-353/99 P) EU:C:2001:661 at 25.
18 Kuijer (II) v. Council (T-211/00) EU:T:2002:30 at 56.
19 Kuijer (II) v. Council (T-211/00) EU:T:2002:30.
406 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
view, the Council failed to consider whether there was a risk that the Union’s
relations with third countries would be prejudiced if the documents in question
were released. Instead of making this specific examination, refusal was based on
general statements and assumptions rather than on an analysis of factors which
effectively may undermine the exception. Yet, in limited circumstances, the
requirement of a document-by-document assessment can be abandoned under
the ‘administrative burden rule’ whereas the institutions can balance the work
that they will have to bear against the public interest in gaining access. In other
words, excessive administrative work caused by a request may allow the institution
to derogate from the principle of widest access.20
4 REGULATION 1049/2001 AND THE RELEVANT CASE LAW
The principle of transparency was established formally in the EU legal order with
the adoption of Regulation 1049/2001 which governs, at the time of writing, the
fundamental21 right of citizens and residents in the EU to access, in principle, all
the documents drawn or held by the EP, Council and Commission.22 Pursuant to
Article 2 of the Regulation, all documents held by the EU organs are currently
subject to the access rules. This marked a significant positive change to the pre-
Regulation regime. As already explained above, under the Code of Conduct,
requests for documents held by the institutions but authored by third parties and
Member States needed to be directed to them since they were not covered by the
access rules.23
20 Hautala v. Council (C-353/99 P) EU:C:2001:661 at 30; Hautala v. Council (T-14/98) EU:T:1999:157
at 86; Kuijer v. Council (T-188/98) EU:T:2000:101 at 55–56; Kuijer (II) v. Council (T-211/00) EU:
T:2002:30 at 57. See e.g. J. Helliskoski & P. Leino, Darkness at the Break of Noon: The Case Law on
Regulation No. 1049/2001 on Access to Documents, 43 C.M.L. Rev. 735 (2007); A. Flanagan, EU
Freedom of Information: Determining where the Interest Lies, 13 E.P.L. 595 (2007).
21 Legal scholars (and applicants before the Courts) have repeatedly argued on the fundamental nature of
the access right. See e.g. D. Curtin, ‘Citizens’ Fundamental Right of Access to EU Information: An Evolving
Digital Passepartout?, 37 C.M.L. Rev. 7 (2000); M. Broberg, Access to Documents: A General Principle of
Community Law, 27 E.L. Rev (2002). This discourse constitutes now a discussion for the past. Post
Lisbon, Art. 6 TEU recognizes the Charter of Fundamental Rights as legally binding, granting it the
same legal value as the Treaties. The Charter includes in Art. 42 a right of access to documents. In
addition Art. 15 TFEU which is the equivalent of the previous Art. 255 EC Treaty is significantly
widened. For example it covers the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and also the Court
of Justice, the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank are covered by this
provision for their administrative tasks.
22 Although in principle the beneficiaries of the right of access to documents are EU citizens and
residents, Art. 2(2) of the Regulation grants discretion to the EU institutions bound by it to grant
access to any natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a MS. The
institutions responded positively to this option. See Decision 2001/840 of the Council ([2001] OJ
L313/40, Decision 2001/937 of the Commission ([2001] OJ L 345/94) and the Decision of the EP
([2001] OJ L 374/I). Additionally, the application of the Regulation was extended, by separate legal
measures, to all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.
23 See Peers, supra n. 3.
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The adoption of the Regulation was seen as a real triumph for the advocates of
transparency in the EU. 24 For the first time in the history of European integration, EU
law set out the binding requirements for securing the democratic right of an informed
citizenry. This Regulation reflects the overall intention, already specified in the second
subparagraph of Article 1 TEU, to mark a new stage in the process of creating an even
closer Union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly and
as closely as possible to the citizen. Similarly, Recital 2 of the Regulation’s Preamble
clarifies that there is a direct causal link between the fundamental right of EU citizens
and residents to have access to information with the democratic nature of the institu-
tions. This formal ability of the public to participate, influence and monitor the
decision-making process intended to increase the state of accountability in the EU as
well as to secure open performance in the decision-making process. Seen from this
perspective, access to documents is considered to be an essential accountability
component, since without information on what basis decisions are being taken, and
by whom, it is impossible for the various accountability forums to hold the actors to
account. Yet, there are a number of ambiguous provisions within the Regulation
which highlight the level of political disagreement over the exact status of transparency
in the EU legal order. It is this ambiguity that imposes an extra duty upon the EU
Courts to establish the right balance amongst the various interests at stake.
In April 2008, the Commission published a legislative proposal to recast the
Regulation.25 Following the publication of the Commission’s proposal, the EP adopted
a number of amendments and, after the Parliament’s requests, the Commission adopted
a later proposal.26 On 15 December 2011, the EP approved the proposal.27 Yet, the
amendment process has not been progressed in the Council. The weak points of the
current regime, as already explained above, stem predominantly from the broad excep-
tions enshrined in the Regulation. Thus, in the amendment process, emphasis must be
based upon the task of clarifying the exceptions. Rather regrettably, the procedure to
recast the current access regime provides evidence to the contrary and the proposal itself
is far from securing transparency.
In particular, Article 2(6) of the Commission’s proposal reduces dramatically
the current standards since it would leave outside the scope of the Regulation
documents relating to individual decisions and investigations until the decision has
been taken and the investigation has been closed or the act has become definitive.
24 I. Harden, Citizenship and Information, 7 E.P.L. 165 (2001).
25 Proposal for a Regulation regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission
documents, COM (2008) 229 final (30 Apr. 2008), 2008/0090(COD).
26 Proposal for a Regulation regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission
documents, COM (2011) 137 final (30 Mar. 2011), 2011/0073(COD).
27 For a general criticism of the Commission’s proposal see N. Diamandouros, ‘Contribution of the
European Ombudsman to the public hearing on the revision of Regulation 1049/2001 on public
access to documents’, speech delivered in the EP on 2 June 2008.
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In addition, ‘documents containing information gathered or obtained from natural
or legal persons by an institution in the framework of such investigations shall not
be accessible to the public even after the closure of the investigation’. At present,
Article 4(2) of the Regulation provides that the disclosure of documents which
would undermine the protection of inspections, investigations and audits shall be
refused, unless there is an overriding public interest following disclosure. If the
proposed provision is adopted this would constitute a step backwards in terms of
the existing status quo, since this provision would not be protected by an overriding
public interest in disclosure.
There are four types of exceptions provided by the Regulation: mandatory,
‘discretionary’, the protection of the decision-making process and, finally, documents
originating from third parties and Member States. The first category of exceptions
(Article 4(1) of theRegulation) precludes access to any of the documents falling within
it and calls for no balancing of interests at stake. If the institutions can prove that the
documents fall into this category, refusal is automatically justified.28 The second
category, set out in Article 4(2), is not really discretionary, since uses the same
mandatory language (‘shall refuse’) as the exceptions in Article 4(1), but is subject to
a public interest override in favour of disclosure.
Thirdly, the decision-making exception in Article 4(3) is the equivalent of the
confidentiality exception under the Code of Conduct. However, the test in the
Regulation sets a higher threshold for non-disclosure than under the Code of
Conduct. Specifically, it requires that the disclosure ‘significantly undermines’ the
decision-making of the EU institutions. Accordingly, the balance is tipped towards
disclosure. Fourthly, with regards to documents drafted by third parties and Member
States, Article 4(4) and (5) requires the institution to consult the third party for
determining whether the exceptions of Article 4(1) and (2) are applicable, unless it is
clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed.
The pre-Regulation case law has, to a large extent, been incorporated into this
Regulation and the interpretation of the old rules is still applicable unless clearly stated
otherwise.29 This is justified by Recital 3 of the Regulation’s Preamble, which states
28 H. Kranenborg, Access to Documents and Data Protection in the European Union: On the Public Nature of
Personal Data, 45 C.M.L. Rev. 1079 (2008); Sison v. Council (T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03)
EU:T:2005:143; Kuijer (II) v. Council (T-211/00) EU:T:2002:30; Hautala v. Council (T-14/98) EU:
T:1999:157; Sweden and Others v. API and Commission (C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P & C-532/07 P) EU:
C:2010:541; Commission v. Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (C-139/07 P) EU:C:2010:376; Access Info
Europe v. Commission (T-851/16) EU:T:2018:69; and Access Info Europe v. Commission (T-852/16) EU:
T:2018:71; Access Info Europe v. Commission (T-851/16) EU:T:2018:69; and Client Earth v. Commission
(T-644/16) EU:T:2018:429.
29 See Peers, supra n. 3; H. Kranenborg, Is It Time to Revise the European Regulation on Public Access to
Documents?, 12 E.P.L. 251 (2006); Franchet and Byk v. Commission (T-391/03 & T-70/04) ECLI:EU:
T:2006:190 at 82 and 88 whereas the court applied and further developed the prior jurisprudence
concerning the exceptions of the access rules.
BEWARE OF COURTS BEARING GIFTS 409
that the Regulation ‘consolidates the initiatives which the institutions have already
taken’. Essentially, the jurisprudence towards the right of access has developed two
approaches. The first one was described as ‘marginal review’, whereas the second was
called as the ‘foreseeability standard’.30 The former approach relates to the fact that the
institutions exercise wide discretion when they apply the exception31 and in conse-
quence judicial review is significantly restrained. The latter confirms the requirement
for the widest possible access so long as the risk to harm the protected interest is not
merely hypothetical.
Despite the careful and consistent emphasis of the EU Courts in opening up
the overall decision-making process, there is a parallel development of a set of
general presumptions against openness (see below), which reveals the existence of a
paradox within that line of case law. Arguably, general presumptions defeat the
very purpose of the widest access which is emphasized categorically during the past
twenty years in the case law.32 More fundamentally, this approach reveals that the
EU Courts have taken a rather limited line on openness which necessarily con-
tributes to the on-going debate about the lack of accountability in the EU. To
substantiate this, the application of the exceptions regarding legislative, adminis-
trative and judicial documents, as per settled case law, is discussed below.
5 LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS
In Turco,33 the applicant requested access to an opinion of the Council’s legal service
relating to a proposal for a Council Directive laying down the minimum standards for
the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States.34 The General Court, in
keeping with prior case law, reiterated that denial of access must be based on a
concrete and individual examination. But nevertheless, the Council’s generality in its
refusal was this time justified by the fact that giving additional information would
deprive the exception relied upon of its effect.35 The rationale behind the legal advice
exception, according to the Court, is to avoid uncertainty by raising doubts over the
legality of EU legislation,36 to secure the independence of the legal service and to
30 D. Adamski, How Wide Is ‘The Widest Possible’? Judicial Interpretation of the Exceptions to the Right of
Access to Official Documents Revisited, 46 C.M.L. Rev. 521 (2009).
31 Kuijer (II) v. Council (T-211/00) EU:T:2002:30 at 53: ‘When the Council decides whether the public
interest may be undermined by releasing a document, it exercises a discretion which is among the
political responsibilities conferred on it by provisions of the Treaties’; Sison v. Council (C-266/05 P)
EU:C:2007:75 [15]: ‘in areas covered by the mandatory exceptions to public access to documents,
provided for in Art. 4(1) (a) of Regulation 1049/2001, the institutions enjoy a wide discretion’.
32 See LPN and Finland v. Commission (C-514/11 P) EU:C:2013:738.
33 Turco v. Council (T-84/03) EU:T:2004:339.
34 Turco v. Council (T-84/03) EU:T:2004:339 at [4].
35 Turco v. Council (T-84/03) EU:T:2004:339 at [74].
36 Turco v. Council (T-84/03) EU:T:2004:339 at [78].
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protect the interest of the institution to receive independent and frank legal advice.37
In essence, the Court ruled that the legal advice exception should escape the well-
established duty, incumbent on institutions, to carry out the case-by-case assessment
and that the public interest override will never apply to such advice. In other words, it
would be impossible to imagine a case in which the override would ever be applied in
practice as regards legal advice.
In relation to legislative matters, this case law can no longer be considered as good
law. The Court of Justice, in the joined cases of Sweden and Turco v Council,38 invalidated
the General Court’s reasoning, upheld the appeal and ruled that legal advice given in the
remit of legislative procedures must be released. The judgment addressed how institu-
tions should deal with disclosure requests relating to legal advice. It was held that when
institutions are asked to disclose such a document, they must carry out a specific three-
stage procedure that corresponds to the three criteria set out by the Court.39 Firstly, the
institution must consider and satisfy itself that the document does relate to legal advice
and if so to examine whether partial access can be given.40 Secondly, the institution is
required to consider whether disclosure of any parts of the document would undermine
the protection of the advice.41 The Court noted that the exception must be understood
in the light of the purpose of the Regulation. Under this, the exception ‘must be
construed as aiming to protect an institution’s interest in seeking legal advice and
receiving frank, objective and comprehensive advice’.42 Finally, it is incumbent on the
institution to balance the interest in non-disclosure against any possible countervailing
interest, bearing inmind the overall purpose to secure the widest possible access, giving a
reasoned judgment.43
What is most important for the interpretation given inTurco is the finding that the
General Court erred in law in concluding that the raison d’être of the legal advice
exception is not to avoid fuelling doubts over the legality of legislation. According to
the wording of the Court of Justice, ‘it is in fact rather a lack of information and debate
which is capable of giving rise to doubts in theminds of citizens, not only as regards the
lawfulness of an isolated act, but also as regards the legitimacy of the decision-making
process as a whole’.44 Therefore, while the judgment increases public access as regards
legal advice, it also more fundamentally places the access rules next to the principles of
37 Turco v. Council(T-84/03) EU:T:2004:339 at [79].
38 Sweden and Turco v. Council (C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P) EU:C:2008:374. See also A. Arnull, Joined
Cases C-39/05 P & C-52/05 P, Sweden and Turco v. Council, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 1 July
2008, 46 C.M.L. Rev. 1219 (2009); D. Adamski, Approximating a Workable Compromise on Access to
Official Documents: The 2011 Developments in the European Courts, 49 C.M.L. Rev. 521 (2012).
39 Sweden and Turco v. Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) EU:C:2008:374 at [37].
40 Sweden and Turco v. Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) EU:C:2008:374 at [38].
41 Sweden and Turco v. Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) EU:C:2008:374 at [40].
42 Sweden and Turco v. Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) EU:C:2008:374 at [42].
43 Sweden and Turco v. Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) EU:C:2008:374 at [44].
44 Sweden and Turco v. Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) EU:C:2008:374 at [59].
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democracy and civil participation in the Union’s overall decision-making process. It
does so in a way which highlights the ability of the citizenry to have access to
information as one of Union’s fundamental credentials.
By upholding the appeal, the Court of Justice reintroduced the cornerstone of
the access regime and its relationship with the state of accountability and legitimacy
in the EU. The ability of the citizenry to assess the impact, comment upon,
influence the development of policies and finally hold the ‘government’ accoun-
table is highlighted throughout the judgment. It follows clearly from the reasoning
of the Court that the EU is democratic in part because of the ability of the citizens
to stay informed. Similarly and in contrast with what was ruled by the General
Court, the overriding public interest pressing for disclosure of the legal advice
needs to be no different from the principles of openness, transparency, democracy
and civil participation in the decision-making process which already underlie the
Regulation.45 The last limb of the delicate balancing exercise is perhaps the
greatest contribution of the Court in terms of accountability since it prioritizes
access amongst the countervailing interests at stake.
Similarly, the validity of wider access in legislative matters was confirmed in
Access info.46 The General Court ruled that the Council erred not to disclose the
identity of countries taking positions on the reform of the EU’s access to docu-
ments rules. In light of this, the Court stated that the Council had ‘in no way
demonstrated’47 how publication of the country names would ‘seriously under-
mine its decision-making process’.48 The Court further found that ‘if citizens are
to be able to exercise their democratic rights, they must be in a position to follow
in detail the decision-making process … and have access to all relevant
information’.49 The Court of Justice confirmed this approach and rejected the
appeal lodged by the Council.50 The Council, however, in practice continues not
to publish the names of the national delegations and full access is confined to a
successful request under the Regulation. More recently, the Court has ruled that
the principle of wider access to documents in the legislative process also applies to
documents drawn up before that process even formally starts, in the context of an
impact assessment for the purposes of a planned legislative proposal.51 Moreover,
the General Court has ruled that the principle of wider access in legislative
procedures rules out any general presumption relating to trilogue documents.52
45 Sweden and Turco v. Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) EU:C:2008:374 at [74].
46 Access Info Europe v. Council (T-233/09) EU:T:2011:105.
47 Access Info Europe v. Council (T-233/09) EU:T:2011:105 at [83].
48 Access Info Europe v. Council (T-233/09) EU:T:2011:105 at [84].
49 Access Info Europe v. Council (T-233/09) EU:T:2011:105 at [69].
50 Council v. Access Info Europe (C-280/11 P) EU:C:2013:671.
51 ClientEarth v. Commission (C-57/16 P) EU:C:2018:660.
52 De Capitani v. EP (C-540/15) ECLI:EU:T:2018:167.
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The approach taken in Turco was indeed promising in terms of transparency.53
It clearly provided the foundations to disclose legal advice given also in the remit of
the executive action of the EU institutions. This was upheld by the General Court
and confirmed by the Court of Justice (as regards legal advice relating to interna-
tional negotiations) in In’t Veld.54
6 THE PARADOX OF TURCO: THE ‘PRESUMPTIONS’ DOCTRINE
While Turco was certainly a very progressive development as far as legislative
documents were concerned, this judicial gift came with hidden limitations – rather
like the legendary Trojan Horse. In particular, the judgment created the doctrine
of ‘general presumptions’ as a ground for refusing access to documents without
individual consideration. According to the Court, ‘[i]t is in principle, open to the
Council to base its decisions […] on general presumptions which apply to certain
categories of documents, as considerations of a generally similar kind are likely to
apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature.’55
In effect, the Court ruled that the Council, and arguably by analogy all the
other institutions, can deny access based on general considerations as opposed to
the previously well-established duty for a specific and detailed examination of each
request. After the Turco ruling, there was every possibility that the institutions, the
Commission in particular, would rely on general considerations in order to avoid
carrying out a concrete appraisal of the requested documents. The Court, with
great respect, set the foundations to depart from the principle of transparency and
to disregard almost two decades of jurisprudence. Indeed, the later developments,
examined further below, provide with sufficient evidence to question the validity
of the early finding that the judgment was spectacularly progressive.
7 ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS: THE END OF THE ONE BY
ONE EXAMINATION?
Despite the adoption of the Regulation, the state of transparency in the EU is still
problematic. The institutions continuously rely on a culture of secrecy and take
every opportunity to deny access. They are bolstered not only by the presumptions
doctrine (as discussed below) but also by an ‘administrative burdens’ exception,
which was also developed by the Courts. In Verein für Konsumenteninformation,56 a
53 See Adamski, supra n. 30.
54 Sophie In’t Veld v. Commission (T-301/10) EU:T:2013:135; Council v. Sophie In’t Veld (C-350/12 P)
EU:C:2014:239.
55 Sweden and Turco v. Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) EU:C:2008:374 at [50].
56 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Commission (T-2/03) EU:T:2005:125.
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consumers’ organization had sought access to the Commission’s administrative file
containing 47,000 pages. The Commission refused access to the entire file on the
grounds that partial access ‘would have represented an excessive and dispropor-
tionate amount of work for it’.57 In essence, the Commission denied access with-
out even looking at the file, not even attempting to browse through the
documents. But assume for a while that the Commission was right and the request
was particularly burdensome. Assume further that the request could even paralyse
the proper functioning of the institution. Should it result in the public being
deprived from the fundamental right of access in such generic terms? Can it be
considered as acceptable for the institutions to reduce the standards of transparency
without invoking the exceptions provided by the Regulation?
The Regulation does not provide in any provision for the requirements of
concrete and individual assessment to be abandoned under any circumstances.
While Article 6(3) provides for an informal consultation aiming to find a fair solution,
Article 7(3) provides that the time limit for handling an application can, under certain
circumstances, be extended. Similarly, the Court noted that in the absence of a fair
solution mentioned in Article 6(3), the Regulation provides no exception similar to
the one developed through the jurisprudence of the Courts relating to the adminis-
trative burden.58 The Court moved on to note that the principle of proportionality
may justify refusal of a concrete and individual examination to avoid cases where a
manifestly unreasonable number of documents is requested which could result in
paralysis of the proper functioning of the institution.59
According to the Court, Article 6(3) of the Regulation reflects the possibility that
where a very large number of documents is requested the institution can ‘reconcile the
interests of the applicant with those of good administration’.60 As a result, there can be
cases that require no individual examination. The Court observed that the possibility of
non-concrete assessment must satisfy four requirements:
(1) The administrative burden entailed by concrete and individual exam-
ination must be heavy and exceed the limits of what may be reasonably
required.
(2) The burden of proof rests within the institution relying on its
unreasonableness
(3) The institution must consult with the applicant in order to ascertain his
interest and consider how it might adopt a measure less onerous than a
concrete and individual examination.
57 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Commission (T-2/03) EU:T:2005:125 at [20].
58 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Commission (T-2/03) EU:T:2005:125 at [96].
59 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Commission (T-2/03) EU:T:2005:125 at [101].
60 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Commission (T-2/03) EU:T:2005:125 at [101].
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(4) The institution must prioritize the most favourable option for the
applicant’s right of access.61
With great respect to the judgment, the validity of the criteria quoted above can be
questioned. The requirements lack proper foundation in the legislation. Had the
legislature wanted to incorporate the pre-Regulation case law on administrative
burden it would have had every opportunity to do so. Yet, the legislature did not
do so because they could hardly see how this restriction could fit with the principle
of the widest possible access and with the corollary fundamental legal standard to
interpret the exceptions narrowly.
The EU Courts developed further the restriction of the administrative burden
rule through the ‘general presumptions’ of non-disclosure. The latest tendency is that
careful scrutiny of the requested documents is no longer necessary for certain cate-
gories of documents since similar considerations justifying application of one or more
of the exceptions to the right of access are likely to apply to documents of the same
nature. In this regard, the Court of Justice in TGI62 recognized the existence of a
general presumption against disclosure with regards to state aid documents in the
administrative file.63 In doing so, the Court established that state aid documents are
essentially exempted from the document-by-document appraisal unless there is a
higher public interest justifying disclosure.64 But nevertheless, the Court has neither
accepted nor explained any valid grounds that may be considered as satisfactory in
terms of a higher public interest override. The Court has taken a similar approach to
merger control, and to competition proceedings more generally.65
The general presumption was also upheld in LPN66 in relation to infringement
proceedings.67 On appeal, the applicants, LPN and Finland, argued that the
Commission denied access without carrying out, in violation of settled case law, a
concrete and individual assessment of the requested documents.68 The Court ruled
‘that it can be presumed (emphasis added) that the disclosure of the documents
61 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Commission (T-2/03) EU:T:2005:125 at [112–115].
62 Commission v. Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (C-139/07 P) ECLI:EU:C:2010:376; see also Commission v.
Agrofert Holding a.s. (C-477/10 P) ECLI:EU:C:2012:394; Commission v. Editions Odile Jacob SAS (C-
404/10 P) ECLI:EU:C:2012:393; Guido Strack v. Commission (T-392/07) ECLI:EU:T:2013:8; Arca
Capital Bohemia (C-440/17) ECLI:EU:C:2018:898; and Arca Capital Bohemia (C-441/17) ECLI:EU:
C:2018:899.
63 Commission v. Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (C-139/07 P) EU:C:2010:376 at [61].
64 Commission v. Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (C-139/07 P) EU:C:2010:376 at [62].
65 Commission v. EnBW (C-365/12 P) EU:C:2014:112. See Edeka-Handelsgesellschaft Hessenring mbH, v.
Commission (T-611/15) ECLI:EU:T:2018:63, where the general presumption applies to a single
document constituting merely a table of contents of a file.
66 LPN and Finland v. Commission (C-514/11) EU:C:2013:738. See also Sumner (C-152/17) ECLI:EU:
C:2018:875 and Campbell (C-312/17) ECLI:EU:C:2018:876. This applies by analogy to the EU ‘pilot
procedureʼ relating to infringements: Sweden v. Commission (C-562/14 P) EU:C:2017:356.
67 LPN v. Commission (T-29/08) EU:T:2011:448 at [126].
68 LPN and Finland v. Commission (C-514/11) EU:C:2013:738 [35].
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concerning the infringement proceedings during the pre-litigation stage risks altering
the nature of that procedure and changing the way it proceeds and, accordingly, that
disclosure would in principle undermine the protection of the purpose of investiga-
tions, within the meaning of the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/
2001’.69
The presumptions case law is in direct contrast with the Treaty framework, in
particular with the requirements to take decisions as openly as possible pursuant to
Article 1 TEU as well as with the overall wording of the Regulation. The
Regulation provides no basis for the establishment of general presumptions. The
Court of Justice’s position on presumptions imposes significant constitutional
ramifications on the fundamental aspect of the access right and incorporates
limitations without the required level of explanation and clarity. The LPN judg-
ment considered that the interests of a non-governmental organization with the
aim of protecting the environment cannot be considered as particularly pertinent
justifying disclosure. That makes one wonder if such an override cannot be
established in an area where possible violations of EU law by Member States
might take place then remains difficult to conceive a scenario where the override
would ever be accepted by the Court. In essence, LPN treats in a rather para-
doxical way a respectable non-governmental organization as a mere ‘busybody’
unable to invoke successfully the override.
8 JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Equally restrictive is the approach of the Court in relation to its own documents.
Currently, the Court may base its decisions on the grounds of general presump-
tions and rule that disclosure of judicial documents is capable of causing harm, in a
foreseeable way, to the outcome of Court proceedings. In API,70 a non-profit-
making organization of foreign journalists made a request to have access to the
Commission’s submissions regarding, inter alia, a number of ongoing cases and one
which, although closed, was related to an open case.71 The General Court ruled
that the Commission could issue a blanket refusal in relation to all documents so
long as the oral argument in the Court proceedings had not yet been presented.
69 LPN and Finland v. Commission (C-514/11) EU:C:2013:738 at [65].
70 Association de la presse internationale a.s.b.l. (API) v. Commission (T-36/04) EU:T:2007:258.
71 Honeywell International v. Commission (T-209/01) EU:T:2005:455 and General Electric v. Commission (T-
210/01) EU:T:2005:456; Airtours v. Commission (T-342/99) EU:T:2002:146; Commission v Austria (C-
203/03) EU:C:2005:76; Commission v. United Kingdom (C-466/98) EU:C:2002:624; Commission v.
Denmark (C-467/98) EU:C:2002:625; Commission v. Finland (C-469/98) EU:C:2002:627; Commission
v. Belgium (C-471/98) EU:C:2002:628; Commission v. Luxembourg (C-472/98) EU:C:2002:629;
Commission v. Austria (C-475/98) EU:C:2002:630 and Commission v. Germany (the Open Skies
cases), (C-476/98) EU:C:2002:631.
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The rationale behind this is to protect the Court proceedings from all external
pressure until the case reaches the final stage of the hearing.72
With great respect, the Court’s ruling was wrong to find that the Commission
was in a position to refuse access to the whole category of judicial documents
without following a concrete and individual examination and without stating
detailed reasons. The blanket refusal accepted by the Court seems to misunderstand
the rationale of the access to documents regime.73 More importantly, it leaves the
access to documents rules at a vulnerable stage. As already explained above, the
mere fact that a document referred to in the application for access concerns an
interest protected by an exception does not justify application of that exception.
The exceptions are applicable only if the institution had previously assessed
whether access would specifically and actually undermine the protected interest
and, if so, there was no overriding public interest under Article 4(2) and (3). The
risk of the protected interest being undermined must not be purely hypothetical.
Consequently, the examination which the institution must undertake needs to be
carried out in a concrete manner and be apparent from the reasons given. Only a
concrete and individual examination, as opposed to an abstract, overall examina-
tion, would enable the institution to assess the possibility of granting the applicant
partial access pursuant to Article 4(6) of the Regulation. The institution’s obliga-
tion to undertake this type of assessment is applicable to all the exceptions found in
paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 4.
On appeal, the Court concluded that access to judicial documents can be denied on
the basis of general presumptions since considerations of a similar kind are likely to apply
to documents of the same nature.74 The Court confirmed that judicial documents are
covered by a presumption against openness until the hearing date, and that disclosure of
the pleadings would undermine their protection, covered by the exception of the
second indent of Article 4(2), while those proceedings remain pending.75 In conse-
quence, the Commission bears no obligation ‘to carry out a concrete assessment of each
document requested in order to determine whether, given the specific content of that
document, its disclosure would undermine the Court proceedings to which it relates’.76
With this judgment, the Court of Justice significantly curtailed the already
limited public access as regards Court proceedings. Post API, the burden of proof
72 Association de la presse internationale a.s.b.l. (API) v. Commission (T-36/04) EU:T:2007:258 at [99].
73 P. Leino, Just a Little Sunshine in the Rain: The 2010 Case Law of the European Court of Justice on Access to
Documents, 48 C.M.L. Rev. 1215 (2011).
74 Sweden and Others v. API and Commission (C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P & C-532/07 P) EU:C:2010:541
at [74].
75 Sweden and Others v. API and Commission (C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P & C-532/07 P) EU:C:2010:541
at [94].
76 Sweden and Others v. API and Commission (C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P & C-532/07 P) EU:C:2010:541
at [104].
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to rebut the presumption of non-disclosure rests on the applicant, whereas pre-
viously the institutions had the burden to prove that concrete and individual
examination was not necessary.77 This is deeply unsatisfactory for the state of
transparency and in conjunction with the finding that the overriding public interest
can only be taken into account as long as it is particularly pertinent effectively
leaves with no access right as regards judicial documents.78 Overall, the decision of
the Court is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it decreases dramatically public
access as regards judicial documents, until a certain point and while the proceed-
ings remain open, and sets the default position to non-disclosure. In terms of
transparency, this is a significant step backwards. Applicants can no longer secure
access for judicial documents unless they rebut, rather unlikely, the presumption of
not disclosure. Secondly and more fundamentally, requires the applicant, rather
illogically, to discharge the burden of the presumption, even though the plaintiff
has no sight of the documents.
While there is a clear strand in the case law about the general presump-
tions, still there are cases in which the EU Courts have rejected the idea of the
presumption and pointed out to the opposite direction on the grounds that
disclosure could not distort the decision-making process.79 Notably, the Court
of Justice has confirmed in Breyer80 that while the presumption of refusal of
Court documents held by the Commission also applies to such documents
submitted by Member States, this presumption still only applies while the
Court proceedings remain pending. Also, the issue of general presumptions
does not arise in relation to Commission opinions on Member States’ draft
technical regulations, since the ‘investigations’ exception to the transparency
rules does not apply to such documents.81 Furthermore, the general presump-
tion applying to infringement proceedings does not apply to general studies on
national application of EU law which have not yet been used to trigger such
proceedings.82 There is no general presumption as regards the information in
the requests for quotation drawn up by the contracting authority under a
framework procurement contract.83 Nor is there a general presumption for
the documents submitted for a marketing authorization application for a
77 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Commission (T-2/03) EU:T:2005:125.
78 Sweden and Others v. API and Commission (C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P & C-532/07 P) EU:C:2010:541
at [157].
79 Sweden v. Commission and MyTravel Group plc. (C-506/08 P) EU:C:2011:496; Batchelor v. Commission
(T-250/08) EU:T:2011:236; NLG v. Commission (T-109 and 444/05) EU:T:2011:235.
80 Patrick Breyer v. Commission (T-188/12) EU:T:2015:124; Commission v. Patrick Breyer C-213/15 P EU:
C:2017:563.
81 Carl Schlyter v. Commission (T-402/12) EU:T:2015:209 at [90]; upheld by France v Carl Schlyter (C-
331/15 P) EU:C:2017:639. See similarly France v. Commission (T-344/15) ECLI:EU:T:2017:250.
82 ClientEarth v. Commission (C-612/13 P) EU:C:2015:486.
83 Evropaïki Dynamiki v. Commission (C-136/15) ECLI:EU:T:2017:915.
418 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
medical product, in particular clinical study reports.84 Similarly, there is no
general presumption relating to the procedure for authorization of the use of
chemicals.85 Finally, as noted already, no general presumption applies to docu-
ments drawn up in the context of an impact assessment for the purposes of a
planned legislative proposal.86
Nevertheless, general considerations leading to the presumption of non-dis-
closure are well-established and very difficult to rebut.87 In practice, the nature of
the requested documents gives rise to different judicial treatment. As already
explained above, while the case law significantly increased public access as regards
legislative documents it has set the default position as regards many non-legislative
documents to non-disclosure. As a result, the presumptions case law reveals the
existence of a paradox. We saw the Court confirm categorically over the last
twenty years that openness secures public oversight of the EU’s decision-making,
describing it as one of the fundamental credentials of the Union’s democratic
society. Yet, the case law significantly decreases public access and leaves intact
the possibility of the EU institutions to refuse access to the entire administrative file
as regards particular categories of documents without even looking at them.
9 CONCLUSION
The Treaty of Lisbon attempted to rectify the transparency inadequacies by
incorporating a generic obligation upon all the EU organs to function openly. In
doing so, the Treaty has reinforced the concept that, without access to the relevant
information, citizens are unable to participate in the decision-making process, to
monitor and finally to hold ‘governmental’ actors accountable. In this way,
transparency enhances awareness, illustrates understanding of the ultimate objec-
tives that the decision-making processes aim to achieve, and finally legitimizes the
EU. Similarly, the transparency Regulation has improved the position of the access
regime in several aspects. Notably, it has codified the exceptions and confirmed the
widest possible access.
The judiciary has also contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to the
development of the access right. It has done so in a more limited way as regards
administrative and judicial documents. The extent to which the jurisprudence
84 Pari Pharma v. EMA (T-235/15) ECLI:EU:T:2018:65; PTC v. EMA (T-718/15) ECLI:EU:
T:2018:66; MSD and Intervet v. EMA (T-529/15) ECLI:EU:T:2018:67; Amicus Therapeutics v. EMA
(T-33/17) EU:T:2018:595.
85 Deza v. ECHA, T-189/14, EU:T:2017:4.
86 ClientEarth v. Commission (C-57/16 P) EU:C:2018:660.
87 LPN and Finland v. Commission EU:C:2013:738; Dennekamp v. Parliament, T-82/09, EU:T:2011:688;
Sweden and Others v. API and Commission, EU:C:2010:541; Commission v. Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau,
C-139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376.
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acknowledges the existence of general presumptions is fundamentally mistaken,
lacking any support in the legislation or the Treaties. As a result of this case law,
the institutions can now offer a wide justification often relating to the entire
administrative file and provide no evidence that they considered less onerous
ways of dealing with the request. This is especially true in the light of the
significant number of cases involving general presumptions as regards the admin-
istrative functions of the institutions.88 In practice, the presumptions case law
establishes a clear distinction between legislative and non-legislative documents
and confirms, contrary to the wording of the Regulation, the widest possible access
with regards to the former category only. For a Union which is constantly
struggling with allegations about its democratic deficit, perhaps a more balanced
judicial attitude in respecting the rule of law as well as the transparency standards
mandated by the legislature would be more appropriate.
88 Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (C-139/07 P) EU:C:2010:376; Commission v. Agrofert
Holding a.s., (C-477/10 P) EU:C:2012:394; LPN and Finland v. Commission (C-514/11 P) EU:
C:2013:738.
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